Miscellaneous and Constitutional Conventions

VI, Fundamental Rights 

“A State is known by the rights it maintains”, remarked Prof H.J. The Constitution of India affrms the  basic principle that every individual is entitled to enjoy certain basic rights and part Ill of the  Constitution deals with those rights which are known as fundamental rights. Originally there were  seven categories of rights, but now they are six in number. They are (i) Right to equality, (ii) Right to  freedom, (iii) Right against exploitation, (iv) Right to freedom of Religion, v) Cultural and Educational  rights and vi) Right to Constitutional remedies. Right to property (Article-31) originally a fundamental  right has been omitted by the 44th Amendment Act. 1978. It is now a legal right. 

These frndamental rights are justifiable and the individual can move the higher judiciary, that  is the Supreme Court or the High Courts, if there is an encroachment on any of these rights.  The right to move to the 

Supreme Court straight for the enforcement of fundamental rights has been guaranteed under Article  32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies). However, fundamental rights in India are not absolute.  Reasonable restrictions can be imposed keeping in view the security-requirements of the state. 

VII. Directive Principles of State Policy 

A novel feature ofthe Constitution is that it contains a chapter in the Directive Principles ofState Policy. These principles are in the nature of directives to the government to implement them for  establishing social and economic democracy in the country. 

It embodies important principles like adequate means to livelihood, equal pay for both men and  women, distribution ofwealth so as to subserve the common good, free and compulsory primary  education, right to work, public assistance in case ofold age, unemployment, sickness and disablement,  the organisation of ‘.iNage Panchayats, special care to the economically back ward sections of the  people etc. Most of these principles could help in making India welfare state. Though not justiciable  these principles have been stated a; “fundamental in the govemance ofthe country”. 

VIII. Fundamental Duties 

A new part IV (A) after the Directive Principles ofState Policy was incorporated in the Constitution by  the 42nd Amendment, 1976 for fimdaments duties. These duties are: 

 To abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the  National Anthem; 

 To cherish and follow the noble ideals, which inspired our national struggle for freedom;  To uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integity of India; 

 To defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so; 

 To promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India .  transcending religious, linguistic, reöonal or sec-tional diversities, to renounce practices  derogatory to the dignity of woman; 

 To value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture; 

 To protect and improve the natural environments including forests, lakes, rivers and wüd life and  to have compassion for living creatures; 

 To develop scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform;

 To safeguard public property and to abjure violence; 

 To strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation  constantly rises to higher levels of Endeavour and achievement. 

The purpose ofincorporating these duties in the Constitution is just to remind the people that while  enjoying their right as citizens, should also perform their duties for rights and duties are correlative. 

IX. Secular State 

A secular state is neither religious nor irreligious, or anti-religious. Rather it is quite neutral in matters  of religion. India being a land ofmany religions, the founding fathers ofthe Constitution thought it  proper to make it a secular state. India is a secular state, because it makes no discrimination between  individuals on the basis of religion. Neither it encourages nor discourages any religion. On the contrary,  right to freedom of religion is ensured in the Constitution and people belonging to any religious group  have the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion they like. 

X An Independent Judiciary 

The judiciary occupies an important place in our Constitution and it is also made independent of the  legislature and the executive. The Supreme Court of India stands at the apex of single integrated judicial  system. It acts as protector offundamental rights of Indian citizens and guardian ofthe Constitution.  Ifany law passed by the legislature or action taken by the executive contravenes the provisions ofthe  Constitution, they can be declared as null and void by the Supreme Court. Thus, it has the power  ofjudicial review. But judicial review in India constitutes a middle path between the American judicial  supremacy in one hand and British Parliamentary supremacy in the other. 

XI. Single Citizenship 

The Constitution of India recognises only single citizenship. In the United States, there is provision  ofdual citizenship. In India, we are citizens of India only, not of the respective states to which we  belong. This provision would help in promoting unity and integrity of the nation. 

Constitutional Convention and its importance: 

The Constitution of a country comprises both written rules enforced by courts, and “unwritten” rules  or principles necessary for Constitutional government. Written rules mandate that they be followed in  a particular specified situation, while unwritten rules come into play when the situation at hand is not  covered by the written rules. Constitutional conventions are rules of political practice, which are  regarded as binding by those to whom they apply. However, they are not laws, as they are not enforced  by courts or by the Houses of Parliament. Often Constitutional conventions are more important than  written Constitutional provisions. For example, the President is empowered by the Constitution to  appoint the Prime Minister, but the Constitution provides no guidance as to who should be appointed  as Prime Minister. Here conventions regarding the appointment ofthe Prime Minister play an  important role in guiding the President. 

Conventions are an instrument of national cooperation and the spirit ofcooperation is as necessary as  the Constitution. They are males elaborated for effecting that cooperation.

Constitutional conventions: A brief study  

Following are some of the characteristics of the conventions: 

Conventions are rules that define non-legal rights, powers and obligations of offce-holders in the three  branches of Government, or the relations between governments or government organs. Conventions in  most cases can be stated only in general terms, their applicability in some circumstances being clear,  but in other circumstances uncertain and debatable. They are distinguishable from males of law, though  they may be equally important, or more important. They may modify the application or enforcement  ofrules of law. 

Constitutional conventions develop over time and are not outlined in any document. Conventions grow  out of practices and precedents determine their existence. Such precedents are not authoritative like  the precedents of a court of law. Every act is a precedent, but not every precedent creates a rule. Sir  Ivor Jennings suggested that in order to establish a convention three questions must be asked: firstly,  what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a  rule; and thirdly, whether there is a good reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason  may be enough to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents without such a reason will be of no  avail, unless the persons concerned regard themselves to be bound by it. 

It is largely through Dicey’s influence that the term “convention” has been accepted to describe a  Constitutional obligation, obedience to which is secured despite the absence of the ordinary means of  enforcing the obligation in a court of law. It must be noted that the obligations do not necessarily, or  indeed usually, derive from agreement. It is more likely to originate from customs or practices arising  out of sheer expediency. Conventions grow out of and are modified by practice. At any given time it  may be diffcult to say whether or not a practice has become a convention. Conventions do not come  from a certain number ofsources, their origins are amorphous and nobody has the åmction ofdeciding  whether conventions exist or not. 

The Choice of a Prime Minister 

India has the bulkiest Constitution and yet certain aspects are left to conventions. One of them is the  appointment of Prime Minister by the President. In England, it is the monarchy whereas in India it is  the President who makes this choice. This choice demands independence ofstatus and familiarity with  political conditions, but no method ofchoice can altogether avoid bias. The nature ofthe monarch’s  choice necessarily depends upon the status of parties in the House of Commons. If a party has a clear  majority, its recognised leader will be the Prime Minister. 

A completely different situation arises where no party gets a majority in the legislature. Here two  possibilities arise—the formation of a coalition government or the formation of a minority government,  as another dissolution at that time is not practicable. It is an accepted rule that when a government is  defeated, either in Parliament or at the polls, the monarch should send for the leader ofthe opposition.  This rule is based on the assumption of impartiality of the crown. 

It is the monarch’s duty to find a government. It is no less the duty of political leaders to assist him.  This duty is threefold— 

A political leader must, if asked, place his views before the monarch. If the offcial opposition defeats  the Government, it is the duty of its leaders to form a new government or to advise the monarch as to  an alternative. It is the duty of the Government to remain in offce as long as it can, without infringing  Constitutional principles.

The position with respect to appointment of Prime Minister is similar in India since our Constitutional  practices are to a large extent derived from English usages, customs and practices. Article 75(1) of the  Indian Constitution gives the President the right to appoint the Prime Minister. In normal circumstances  it is the leader of the majority in the House of the People (Lok Sabha). But, in circumstances where the  Prime Minister dies in offce or resigns, the President will have to exercise his personal judgment. The  party may have no recognised leader, or either ofthe two parties may be able to form a government and  command the support of the House of the People. In such circumstances the President may explore the  possibility of finding a person who could form a coalition with the help oftwo or more parties and  command the support of the Lok Sabha. It was such discretion that President Reddy exercised in 1979  after the fall of the Janta Ministry in inviting Charan Singh to form the ministry and also in not inviting  Jagjivan Ram to do so after Charan Singh resigned and advised the dissolution of the House. 

Options in a hung Lok Sabha 

Article 75(1) of the Constitution states that the President shall appoint the Prime Minister. Clause (3)  adds:”75. (3) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.”  Therefore, the Prime Minister must command a majority in the House at the time ofthe vote of  confidence. However, in an uncertain situation, say in the case ofhung Lok Sabha, how is the President  to determine which ofthe party leaders will manage to secure majority support? Until they dropped it  in the final stages ofthe proceedings ofthe Constituent Assembly on 11-10-1949, the framers oft-he  Constitution had proposed instruments of instructions to guide the President and the Governors. Para  two of the instructions to the President enjoined him to “appoint a person who has been found by him  most likely to command a stable majority in Parliament as the Prime Minister”. This is of little help  except in that it explicitly permits the President to act on probabilities. A mistaken assessment will  invite charges of partisanship. 

In a letter dated 17-5-1967 to three former Chief Justices of India, Justices Mahajan, Sarkar and  Gajendragadkar and eminent Constitutional experts like M.C. Setalvad and H.M. Seervai, the then  Home 

Minister Y.B. Chavan mentioned three views on the appointment of the Chief Minister and sought their  legal opinion on it. The three views were: The leader of the largest party in the legislature should be  invited to form the Government irrespective ofwhether or not such a party commands a stable majority. 

If the party in power failed to secure an absolute majority in the newly- elected legislature, the leader  of that party should not be invited to form the Govemment because the electoral verdict should be  regarded as, in effect, disqualifying the party from holding offce for another term.The Governor  should make endeavour to appoint a person who is most likely to command a majority in the  legislature. 

There was complete agreement on the third, an obvious choice but of little practical value. The  Sarkaria Commission’s report did not agree with this and propounded its own rules. The subject was  also discussed in the report of the Committee of Governors, 1971 , appointed by the President to study  and formulate norms and conventions on the role ofthe Governors. It rejected the rigid arithmetical  test ofthe leader of the largest single party. Three British works on Constitutional and administrative  law share this view. S.A. Smith speaks of a ministry “with a reasonable prospect of maintaining itself  in omce”. Wade and Bradley opt for “that person who is in the best position to receive the support of  the majority”. Hood Phillips’ formulation is “a ministry that can hold a majority in the House”. The  above authorities expose the absurdity of the then President R. Venkataraman’s “objective” test of  summoning the parties in the order oftheir numerical strength, that he propounded as a great  contribution to Constitutional practice. 

British precedent and the dicta ofeminent authorities do not support any such arithmetical test. Another  example of such absurdity is that of Dr. S.D. Sharma’s decision to appoint Mr Vajpayee as the Prime  Minister on 15-5-1996. The sole consideration behind Mr Sharma’s decision seemed to be the  “arithmetic” test that Mr Venkataraman talked about in his book, My Presidential Years. Such decisions 

lower the image of the high offce ofthe President, more so, when the appointed Prime Minister fails to  secure the majority in the House as it happened in the case ofMr Vajpayee, whose Government fell  within 13 days of its appointment. Yet another example will be that of the case of Bihar where the  Govemor decided to ask Mr Nitish Kumar to form the Government despite the fact he was in no position  to command majority in the House, and had to ultimately resign. Such decisions sully the image of the  offce of the President and Governors, and also go against the spirit of democracy. 

Being leader of the single largest party does not necessarily mean being the leader ofthe majority  members of the House. A person need not be the leader of the single largest party in the House to  command the support ofthe House. The practice now more or less seems to be settled that the leader  ofthe party who is able to secure the support of the House should be invited to form the Govemment.  This again brings us back to the question, when and how does a practice become a convention? Ivor  Jennings’s three-stage test mentioned before might be helpful in deciding whether a practice has  crystallised into a convention or not but that is not a conclusive test for determining the existence ofa  convention. There has been demand from several quarters to codify the convention with respect to the  appointment of Prime Minister and Chief Ministers. The reason given is that having a Constitution,  we should not leave the appointrnents to these high offces on conventions. The controversy invariably  surrounding every appointment (in cases where no one party has ab”lute majority) of the Prime  Minister and Chief Ministers further strengthens the demand for codification of conventions. One of  the suggestions that have been put forward is the amendmznt of Article 75 ofthe Constitution so as to  have the following effect: “The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President on the  recommendation ofthe House ofthe People which recommendation shall be binding on the President”.  Thus the onus will be on the legislature to choose the Prime Minister, than on the President. Such a  move is welcome since it will help in avoiding confusion and controversies in the appointment of the  Prime Minister and Chief Ministers. However, at the same time it must also be kept in mind that a  Constitution cannot contain all and sundry provisions concerning a matter including that for the  appointment of Prime Minister. Moreover, the discretion to appoint the Prime Minister has been vested  in none other than the President who is the head ofthe republic. Hence, the presumption that he will  act impartially should always weigh in his favour. 

Dissolution of the House: 

The Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha of each State are dissolved at the end oftheir terms, every five  years. However, this article only deals with irregular dissolutions, which occur before the term of a  House is over. The theory behind the right to advise dissolution is that when the Government loses the  confidence of the House, it may, instead of resigning, assert that the House itself has ceased to reflect  the will of the electorate, which constitutes the political sovereign. Dissolution is thus an appeal to the  electorate. Two major controversies in the dissolution of the House are first, whether the advice to  dissolve the House should be tendered by the Prime Minister alone or the Cabinet as a whole and  second, whether the President’s discretion with respect to dissolution can override express advice to the  contrary tendered by the council of Ministers. The former controversy had been raging among British  jurists particularly in the last century, but has not been of much relevance in India, so the discussion  here will be confined to the Presidential discretion in dissolving the House. 

President’s Discretion: 

The question has often come up whether it is binding upon the President to follow the advice tendered  by the Prime Minister, regarding dissolution of the House, when the Prime Minster has lost the  confidence of the House. When the Prime Minister enjoys the support of the House, advice to dissolve  the House would be binding, since no alternative government is possible. Article 74(1) provides that  the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers with the  Prime Minister at its head. However in the case of ±msher Singh v. State ofPunjab, Krishna lyer, J. laid 

down certain exceptions in which the President was not obligated to act in accordance with the advice  given by the Council of Ministers and was required to exercise his discretion. Such instances included  situations regarding the dismissal of a government which had lost its majority in the House, but was  refusing to quit offce and the dissolution of the House of the People was required. However, the  judgment also stated that even in cases regarding dissolution, the President should avoid getting  involved in politics and act on the advice of the Prime Minister. Thus, the limits of the President’s  discretion are carefully circumscribed. However, the President, according to his oath of offce, has to  preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. So the President should not be bound by the  unConstitutional advice of a ministry to dissolve the House. The House represents the will of the  electorate, but the will of the electorate is subject to the Constitution. Hence the President will be bound  to reject the advice ifsuch advice is against the spirit ofthe Constitution. 

As per Dr. Eugene Forsey, in a multi-party system (as prevalent in India) it may be necessary for the  President to refuse dissolution and consult the leaders of the Opposition parties or call on such persons  to form a government. If all possible alternative Prime Ministers decline the task, then the only course  left open is to allow the present government’s proposal for dissolution. 

President’s independent initiative 

There is a conflict ofviews regarding whether the head of the State can dissolve Parliament without  such advice being given. There have been two instances in the history of Britain when the Crown  dismissed a ministry that commanded the confidence ofthe House of Commons and dissolved the  House. 

The first instance was in 1784. The King, George Ill removed the Prime Minister from his office and  installed Pitt as Prime Minister. He proceeded to dissolve the House of Commons and in the ensuing  elections, Pitt won a decisive victory. But the question was raised whether the actions of George Ill  were Constitutional. George Ill believed that the House of Commons no longer represented the wishes  of the nation. He was proved right in the elections. The authority ofthe House of Commons is derived  from the fact that it represents the will ofthe nation. The chiefobject of dissolution should be to ensure  that the will of Parliament comes in conformity with the nation’s will. Hence, George Ill’s actions are  regarded as Constitutional. In India, such action will be regarded as Constitutional in exceptional cases,  when the Council of Ministers acts in blatant disregard ofConstitutional practices, such as when the  Ministry refuses to resign or advise dissolution after losing the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha. 

The second such instance occurred in 1834 when George IV dismissed the Prime Minister and  appointed Peel in his place and then went on to dissolve Parliament. The ensuing elections went against  Peel. From a Constitutional point of view, the dissolution is regarded as a mistake as the belief that the  House of Commons had stopped representing the will ofthe nation was wrong. However, the essential  point to note is that both the dissolutions admit the principle that it is the verdict of the political  sovereign (the people of the State), which ultimately determines the right of the Cabinet to remain in  office. Dissolution is required when the wishes of the nation are presumed to be different from the  wishes of the legislature. Hence dissolution has been described by Dicey as an appeal from the legal  sovereign (the Crown) to the political sovereign. 

In India, the question came up when the V.P. Singh government resigned in 1990, without  advising the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The President, Mr R. Venkataraman held the  view that Prime Ministerial advice was a must for dissolution. However, when Mr  Chandrashekhar resigned as Prime Minister in 1991 and advised dissolution ofthe House, Mr  Venkataraman said that the question ofdissolution ofthe Lok Sabha would be considered  separately. The President then waited a whole week before announcing the dissolution ofthe  Lok Sabha on 13-3-1991 and stated that the advice ofthe Prime Minister was not the sole reason  for taking the decision.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had told the Constituent Assembly on 4th November, 1948 that the President could  do nothing contrary to the advice of the Ministers nor could he do anything v,äthout their advice. But,  on 3012-1948 Dr. Ambedkar stated that dissolution and the appointment of the Prime Minister are two  prerogatives that the President will enjoy. 

No instance has occurred in India where the President dissolved the legislature on his own initiative. It  is believed that such wide power to dissolve the House without advice cannot be vested in a single  individual, who has not even been elected directly by the people and is not responsible to Parliament  either. Moreover, it is not possible to work out adequate safeguards to ensure that such power is not  abused. Therefore, the President cannot, on his own initiative, dissolve the Lok Sabha, except under  very exceptional cases, when the Council of Ministers acts in blatant disregard ofConstitutional  practices, as mentioned above. However, such situations are unlikely to arise in a parliamentary  democracy where the Government goes to polls every 5 years. 

Refusal to dissolution: 

The second question regards the power ofthe President to refuse to dissolve the House on being  advised to do so. The monarch has to act upon the advice of the Prime Minister unless prepared to  dismiss him from offce. Such refusals have been witnessed in former dominions of Britain. In 1926,  the Governor-General of Canada, Lord Byng refused dissolution to the Liberal Prime Minister  Mackenzie King and instead dismissed him and invited the Conservative leader Meighen to form the  Govemment. In 1939, the GovemorGeneral ofSouth Africa, Sir Patrick Duncan refused dissolution to  Prime Minister General Hertzog, whose proposal that South Africa remain neutral in the Second World  War was defeated in Parliament, and invited General Smuts to form a government. Sir Ivor Jennings  is of the opinion that the prerogative to refuse dissolution lies with the Crown in theory alone and  cannot be exercised in practice. 

Article 13.2.2 ofthe Irish Constitution allows the President to refuse dissolution only when the  Govemment has lost majority support in the House. In 1994, the coalition government of Fianna Fail  and the Labour Party collapsed. Instead of dissolving the House, the President invited another coalition  government to assume omce as it was better not to terminate Parliament and force fresh elections on  people when an alternative government was possible. 

The advice to dissolve the House should be refused if the following situations exist: The existing Parliament is sdll viable and capable of doing its job. A general election would be  detrimental to national economy.The President could find another Prime Minister who would carry on  his govemment for a reasonable period with a working majority in the House. 

Further, other considerations such as how long the House has been in existence may be taken into  account. The President may be reluctant to grant dissolution to a newly constituted House. 

Till date, the President has never refused to dissolve the legislature, on being advised to do so, but if  the President is satisfied as to the existence of the above conditions, then the possibility ofrefusal cannot  be nailed out. Dr. Ambedkar was of the opinion that when the President receives advice for dissolution,  he should test the feelings ofthe House ifit agrees that there should be dissolution or it agrees that the  affairs should be carried on with some other leader. 

The National Commission to review the working of the Constitution argued that one of the methods of  restoring the stability and cohesion in the parliamentary system ofgovemment is to strengthen the  institution ofthe Prime Minister and one of the ways of doing so is to empower the Prime Minister to  advise dissolution of the House whenever he thinks that the House has exhausted its mandate and a  fresh appeal to the electorate is called for. But, the proposition contemplates such a power in the Prime  Minister even after he has lost confidence ofthe House. It is based on the view that the recognition  ofsuch power in the Prime Minister would impart much needed stability to the political system in the  country and would enable the leader ofthe House to address determinedly issues of development,  national security, etc. But, the Commission finally concluded that the present Constitutional position  needs no modification.

Importance of Convention: 

Notwithstanding the fact that ours is a detailed Constitution, the Constitution-framers left  certain matters to be govemed by conventions, thereby giving to the holders ofConstitutional  offces some degee ofdiscretion in respect ofsuch matters. Conventions lubricate the room left  at the joints in the Constitutional structure and protect them against ossification. The main  purpose of the Constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework ofthe  Constitution ruins its flexibility to operate in tune with the prevailing Constitutional values  ofthe period. Although conventions are not legally enforceable and the sanction behind them  is moral and political, yet some conventions of the Constitution which set norms of behaviour  of those in power or which regulate the working ofthe va.rious pars ofthe Constitution and their  relations to one another, may be as important, if not ofgreater significance, as the witten word  ofthe Constitution itself. 

One unfortunate fact ofthe Indian situation is that enough attention has not been paid to the evolution  and observance ofthe right codes ofconduct and conventions. Even the codes and conventions evolved  in the earlier years have been broken too lightly in the later years. There is an increasing tendency to  resort to extra-Constitutional methods to force settlement of political or economic issues—imagined or  real. This would be a cause for concern even in a small homogeneous country. In India, a heterogeneous  country of huge dimensions, this cannot be a matter of grave anxiety. Hence, natural reaction would be  that the loopholes in the Constitution which have permitted aberrant developments should be plugged.  It is urged that, if conventions do not work, appropriate Constitutional safeguards should be provided.  If appropriate conventions are not followed and the discretion provided under certain circumstances is  misused, the entire system may collapse. In order that appropriate conventions and codes of conduct  get evolved, it is essential that incumbents ofConstitutional omces are selected from among persons  ofadmitted competence and integrity and provided with reasonable security oftenure. 

The main purpose ofconventions is to guide the use ofConstitutional discretion. Thus, every time there  is a general election or a request for dissolution ofthe House of People, the questions that start doing  rounds are whom will the President invite to form the next govemment? What ifthe President invites  someone to form a government who does not have a clear majority in the Lok Sabha? Will the President  heed to the advice of the Cabinet to dissolve the House? These are some of the important questions to  which the Constitution provides no answer to, and this is where conventions play their part as a catalyst. 

Some conventions are well-established and may be relied upon absolutely, while some are vague and  may lead to manipulation for political purposes. For example, appointment ofthe Prime Minister is to  be done by the President and the prevailing convention is that the person enjoying support of the  absolute majority ofthe House concemed is appointed to the respective offce. The snag lies in  ascertaining that support. The task of the President becomes diffcult and open to criticism, as he has to  often follow vague conventions and foreign precedents. The conventions being vague, the President  may go on appointing the leader ofthe largest party in the Lok Sabha as the Prime Minister, despite the  fact that the appointed Prime Minister is not in a position to secure majority in the Lok Sabha. 

Hence ifthe conventions are codified and the effect ofthat codification is to give jurisdiction to the  courts to enforce the codified conventions then in such a scenario the flexibility of the conventions will  be lost. Moreover, codified laws cannot cover any and every situation that might arise. Hence, it makes  more sense to leave the conventions uncodified. 

Therefore, since the main purpose ofthe Constitutional Conventions is to ensure that the legal  framework ofthe Constitution retains its flexibility to operate in tune with the prevailing Constitutional  values ofthe period, it helps the Constitution to adapt and make amends according to the needs and  desire ofthe cha.nøng times, as the Founders ofour Constitution couldn’t have foreseen and safeguarded  the Constitution from future loopholes and hence left certain matters to be govemed by conventions as  they are as important, if not of greater significance, as the word ofthe Constitution itself. 

Parliamentary Supremacy:

The doctrine of ‘sovereignty of Parliament’ is associated with the British Parliament. Sovereignty means  the supreme power within the State. That supreme power in Great Britain lies with the Parliament.  There are no ‘legal’ restrictions on its authority and jurisdiction. Therefore, the sovereignty of  Parliament (parliamentary supremacy) is a cardinal feature of the British Constitutional system.  According to A.V. Dicey, the British jurist, this principle has three implications: 

1. The Parliament can make, amend, substitute or repeal any law. De Lolme, a British political  analyst, said, ‘The British Parliament can do everything except make a woman a man and a man  a woman’. 

2. The Parliament can make Constitutional laws by the same procedure as ordinary laws.ln  other words, there is no legal distinction between the constituent authority and the legislative  authority of the British Parliament. 

3. The Parliamentary laws cannot be declared invalid by the Judiciary as being unconstitutional. In  other words, there is no system of judicial review in Britain. The Indian Parliament, on the other hand,  cannot be regarded as a sovereign body in the similar sense as there are ‘legal’ restrictions on its authority  and jurisdiction.