Theory of Separation of power, judicial powers

Theory of Separation of power: 

The three organs of the government—Legislature, Executive and Judiciary— perform the three  essential functions of law-making, law-application and law- adjudication. This threefold  division of governmental functions is universally accepted as the best way of organizing the  government. These three functions are inter-related and inter-dependent. But these are  performed by three different organs. 

Central idea of the theory of Separation of Powers: 

The Theory of Separation of Powers holds that the three organs of government must be  separate and independent from one another. Any combination of these three functions into a  single or two organs is harmful and dangerous for individual liberty. Separation of powers of  the three organs is essential for the emciency of the government and the liberty of the people.  Government can work systematically and effciently only when each of its organs exercises its  own powers and functions. Similarly, the liberty of the people can be protected only when  there is no concentration or combination ofthe three govemmental powers in the hands of one  or two organs. 

The theory of Separation of Powers holds that for keeping the govemment limited, which is  necessary for protecting the liberty of the people, the three functions ofgovernment should be  separated and performed by three separate organs. 

Meaning of Separation of Powers: 

In simple words, the theory of Separation of Powers advocates that the three powers of the  government should be used by three separate organs. Legislature should use only law making  powers, Executive should undertake only law enforcement ff.nctions, and Judiciary should  perform only adjudicationoudicial functions. Their powers and responsibilities should be  clearly defined and kept separate. This is essential for securing the liberty of the people. 

Separation of Powers: views of Montesquieu: 

In his book The Spirit ofThe Laws’ ( 1748), Montesquieu enunciated and explained his theory  of Separation of Powers. He wrote, 

 Ifthe legislative and executive powers are combined in the same organ, the liberty of the  people gets jeopardized because it leads to tyrannical exercise of these two powers. 

 If the judicial and legislative powers are combined in the same organ, the interpretation of laws becomes meaningless because in this case the law-maker also acts as the law  interpreter and he never accepts the errors of his laws. 

 If the judicial power is combined with the executive power and is given to one-person or  one organ, the administration of justice becomes meaningless and faulty because then  the police (Executive) becomes the judge (judiciary). 

 Finally if all the three legislative, executive and judicial powers are combined and given  to one person or one organ, the concentration of power becomes so big that it virtually  ends all liberty. It establishes despotism of that person or organ.

As such, the three powers should not be combined and given neither to a single organ nor to  two organs. These three powers should be used by three separate organs ofthe government. It  is essential for safeguarding the liberty of the people. 

Latimer House Principles: 

Objective: 

The objective of these Principles is to provide, in accordance with the laws and customs of  each Commonwealth country, an effective framework for the implementation by governments,  parliaments and judiciaries of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values. 

I) The Three Branches of Government 

Each Commonwealth country’s Parliaments, Executives and Judiciaries are the guarantors in  their respective spheres ofthe nde oflaw, the promotion and protection offundamental human  rights and the entrenchment ofgood governance based on the highest standards of honesty,  probity and accountability. 

Il) Parliament and the Judiciary 

(a) Relations between parliament and the judicia.ryshould be govemed by respect for  parliament’sprimary responsibility for law making on the one hand and for the judiciary’s  responsibility for the interpretation and application ofthe law on the other hand. 

(b) Judiciaries and parliaments should fulfill their respective but critical roles in the  promotion of the rule oflaw in a complementary and constructive manner. 

Ill) Independence of Parliamentarians 

(a) Parliamentarians must be able to cany out their legislative and Constitutional  Rmctionsin accordance with the Constitution, free from unlawful interference. 

(b) Criminal and defamation laws should not be used to restrict legitimate criticism of  Parliament; the offence of contempt of parliament should be narrowly drawn and  reporting of the proceedings of parliament should not be unduly restricted by narrow  application ofthe defence ofqual.ified privilege. 

IV) Independence of the Judiciary 

An independent, impartial, honest and competent judiciary is integral to upholding the rule of  law, engendering public confidence and dispensing justice. The function of the judiciary is to  interpret and apply national Constitutions and legislation, consistent with international human  rights conventions and international law, to the extent permitted by the domestic law ofeach  Commonwealth country. 

To secure these aims: 

 Judicial appointments should be made on the basis of clearly defined criteria and  by a publicly declared process. The process should ensure: equality of opportunity for  all who are eligible for judicial offce; appointment on merit; and that appropriate 

consideration is given to the need for the progressive attainment ofgender equity and the  removal ofother historic factors of discrimination; 

 Arrangements for appropriate security oftenure and protection oflevels of  remuneration must be in place; 

 Adequate resources should be provided for the judicial system to operate  effectively without any undue constraints which may hamper the independence sought; 

 Interaction, if any, between the executive and the judiciary should not compromise  judicial independence. Judges should be subject to suspension or removal only for  reasons of incapacity or misbehavior that clearly renders them unfit to discharge their  duties. Court proceedings should, unless the law or overriding public interest otherwise  dictates, be open to the public. Superior Court decisions should be published and  accessible to the public and be given in a timely manner. An independent, and competent  legal profession is fimdamental to the upholding of the rule of law and the independence  ofthe judiciary. 

V) Public Offce Holders 

a) Merit and proven integrity, should be the criteria ofeligibility for appointment  to public offce; 

b) Subject to (a), measures maybe taken, where possible and appropriate, to ensure  that the holders of all public omces generally reflect the composition of the community  in terms of gender, ethnicity, social and religious groups and regional balance. 

VI) Ethical Govemance 

Ministers, Members of Parliament, judicial offcers and public offce holders in each jurisdiction  should respectively develop, adopt and periodically review appropriate guidelines for ethical  conduct. These should address the issue of conflict of interest, whether actual or perceived,  with a view to enhancing transparency, accountability and public confidence. 

VII) Accountability Mechanisms 

Executive Accountability to Parliament: 

Parliaments and governments should maintain high standards of accountability, transparency  and responsibility in the conduct of all public business. Parliamentary procedures should  provide adequate mechanisms to enforce the accountability of the executive to Parliament. 

Judicial Accountability: 

Judges are accountable to the Constitution and to the law which they must applyhonesdy,  independently and with integrity. The principles ofjudicial accountability and independence  underpin public confidence in the judicial system and the importance ofthe judicia.ry as one  ofthe three pillars upon which a responsible government relies. 

In addition to providing proper procedures for the removal of judges on grounds of incapacity  or misbehaviour that are required to support the principle ofindependence ofthe judiciary, any 

disciplinary procedures should be fairly and objectively administered. Disciplinary  proceedings which might lead to the removal ofa judicial offcer should include appropriate  safeguards to ensure fairness. The criminal law and contempt proceedings should not be used  to restrict legitimate criticism ofthe performance ofjudicial Ranctions. 

Judicial review 

Best democratic principles require that the actions of governments are open to scrutiny by the  courts, to ensure that decisions taken comply with the Constitution, with relevant statutes and  other law, including the law relating to the principles of natural justice. 

VIII) The law-making process 

In order to enhance the effecGveness oflaw making as an essential element ofthe good  governance agenda. There should be adequate parliamentary examination ofproposed  leøslation; where appropriate, opportunity should be given for public input into the legislative  process; Parliaments should, where relevant, be øven the opportunity to consider international  instruments or regional conventions agreed to by governments. 

DO Oversight of Govemment 

The promotion of zero-tolerance for is vital to good governance. A transparent and accountable  government, together with freedom of expression, encourages the finll participation of its  citizens in the democratic process. Steps which may be taken to encourage public sector  accountabi.lity include: 

(a) The establishment of scrutiny bodies and mechanisms to oversee Govemment,  enhances public confidence in the integrity and acceptability of government’s activities.  Independent bodies such as Public Accounts Committees, Ombudsmen, Human Rights  Commissions, Auditors-General, Anticorruption commissions, Information  Commissioners and similar oversight institutions can play a key role in enhancing public  awareness ofgood governance and rule oflaw issues. Governments are encouraged to  establish or enhance appropriate oversight bodies in accordance with national  circumstances, 

(b) Government’s transparency and accountability is promoted by an independent and  vibrant media which is responsible, objective and impartial and which is protected by  law in its freedom to report and comment upon public affairs. 

X) Civil Society 

Parliaments and governments should recognize the role that civil society plays in the  implementation of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values and should strive for a  relationship with society to ensure that there is broader opportunity for lawful participation in  the democratic process. 

Theory of Checks and Balances: 

The concept ofConstitutional checks arose as an outgrowth ofthe classical theory of  separation of powers, by which the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government  were held properly to be vested in three different units. The purpose ofthis, and of the later  development of checks and balances, was to ensure that governmental power would not be 

used in an abusive manner. However, in its original form the concept involved social classes  rather than govemment departments. 

Checks and balances is closely related to separation ofpowers. In the checks and balances  configuration, each branch of government is limited by the other branches of govemment.  Checks and balances ensures that one branch is not too powerft.l in the exercise ofgovemment  power. In the ofchecks and balances, power is seen as something potent that has to be limited  so that it is not abused. To balance out power, it is limited or checked by other branches. 

In the Supreme Coun Employ”‘ Wehre v. Union of India (1990), it was held that no court can  issue a direction to a legislature to enact a particular law neither it can direct an executive  authority to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative  authority. 

Further in Bandhuva Mukd Morcha v. Union of India (1984), Pathak J., said: “the Constitution  envisages a broad division ofthe power ofstate bem^reen the legislature, the executive and the  judiciary. Although the division is not precisely demarcated, there is general acknowledgment  of its limits. The limits can be gathered from the written text of the Constitution, from  conventions and Constitutional practice, and from an entire array ofjudicial decisions.” 

Judicial review: 

The power of Judiciary to review and determine validity of a law or an order may be described  as the power of “Judicial Review.” 

It means that the Constitution is the Supreme law ofthe land and any law in consistent there  with is void. The term refers to “the power ofa court to inquire whether a law executive order  or other official action conflicts with the written and ifthe court concludes that it does, to  declare it unconstitutional and void.”Judicial Review has two prime functions: 

(1) Legitimizing government action; 

(2) toprotect the Constitution against anyundue encroachment by the government. 

The most distinctive feature ofthe work of United States Supreme Court is its power ofjudicial  review. As guardian of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has to review the laws and  executive orders to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution ofthe country and the valid  laws passed by the congress. 

The power ofjudicial review was first acquired by the Supreme Court in Marbury vs. Madison  case 1803.The Constitution of India, in this respect, is more a kin to the U.S. Constitution than  the British. In Britain, the doctrine ofparliamentary supremacy still holds goods. No court of  law there can declare a parliamentary enactment invalid. On the contrary every court is  constrained to enforce every provision” of the law of parliament. 

Under the Constitution of India parliament is not Supreme. Its powers are limited in the two  ways. First, there is the division ofpowers benveen the union and the states. Parliament is  competent to pass laws only with respect to those subjects which are guaranteed to the citizens  against every form of legislative encroachment.

Being the guardian Fundamental Rights and the arbiter of-Constitutional conflicts between the  union and the states with respect to the division of powers between them, the Supreme Court  stands in a unique position where from it is competent to exercise the power of reviewing  legislative enactments both of parliament and the state legislatures. 

This is what makes the court a powerful instrument of judicial review under the Constitution. As Dr. M.P. Jain has rightly observed: “The doctrine of judicial review is thus firmly rooted  in India, and has the explicit sanction of the Constitution.”ln the framework of a Constitution  which guarantees individual Fundamental Rights, divides power between the union and the  states and clearly defines and delimits the powers and functions ofevery organ ofthe state  including the parliament, judiciary plays a very important role under their powers ofjudicial  review. 

The power ofjudicial review of legislation is given to the judiciary both by the political theory  and text of the Constitution. There are several specific provisions in the Indian Constitution,  judicial review of legislation such as Act 13, 32, 131-136, 143, 226, 145, 246, 251, 254 and  372. Article 372 (1) establishes the judicial review ofthe pre-Constitutional legislation  similarly. Article 13 specifically declares that any law which contravenes any of the provision  of the part of Fundamental Rights shall be void. Even our Supreme Court has observed, even  without the specific provisions in Article 13. 

The Court would have the power to declare any enactment which transgresses a Fundamental  Right as invalid. The Supreme and high courts are constituted the protector and guarantor of  Fundamental Rights under Articles 32 and 226. Articles 251 and 254 say that in case of in  consistent if between union and state laws, the state law shall be void. 

The basic function ofthe courts is to adjudicate disputed between individuals and the state,  between the states and the union and while so adjudicating, the courts may be required to  interpret the provisions of the Constitution and the laws, and the interpretation given by the  Supreme Court becomes the law honoured by all courts ofthe land. There is no appeal against  the judgement of the Supreme Court. 

In Shankari Prasad v. Union ofIndia (1951) the first Amendment Act of 1951 was challenged  before the Supreme Court on the ground that the said Act abridged the right to property and  that it could not be done as there was a restriction on the amendment of Fundamental Rights  under Article 13 (2). 

The Supreme Court rejected the contention and unanimously held. “The terms ofArticle 368  are perfectly general and empower parliament to amend the Constitution without any exception  whatever. In the context of Article 13 law must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in  exercise of ordinary legislative power and amendments to the Constitution made in exercise  ofconstituent power, with the result that Article 13 (2) does not affect amendments made under  Article 368. ” 

In Sajan Singh’s cae (1964), the corupetence of parliament to enact 17th amendment was  challenged before the Constitution. Bench comprising of five judges on the ground that it  violated the Fundamental Rights under Article 31 (A).The Supreme court reiterated its earlier  stand taken in Shankari sad’s case and held, “when article 368 confers on parliament the right  to amend the Constitution the power in question can be exercised over all the provisions of the  Constitution, it would be unreason about to hold that the word law’ in article 13 (2) takes in  amendment Acts passed under article 368.” Thus, until 1967 the Supreme Court held that the  Amendment Acts were not ordinary laws, and could not be struck down by the application of  Article 13 (2).

The historic case of Golak Nath v. The Sute of Punjab (1967) was heard by a special bench of  11 judges as the validity ofthree Constitutional amendments (1st, 4th and 17th) was challenged.  The Supreme Court by a majority of 6 to 5 reversed its earlier decision and declared that  parliament under Article 368 has no power to take away or abridge the Fundamental Rights  contained in Chapter Il of the Constitution. The Court observed that: 

 Article 368 only provides a procedure to be followed regarding amendment of the  Constitution. 

 Article 368 does not contain the actual power to amend the Constitution. 

 The power to amend the Constitution is derived from Article 245, 246 and 248 and  entry 97 of the union list. 

 The expression ‘law’ as defined in Article 13 (3) includes not only the law made  by the parliament in exercise ofits ordinary legislative power but also an amendment  ofthe Constitution made in exercise ofits Constitution power. , 

 The amendment of the Constitution being a law within the meaning of Article 13  (3) would be void under Article 13 (2) of it takes away or abridges the rights conferred  by part Ill of the Constitution. 

 The First Amendment Act 1951 , the fourth Amendment Act 1955 and the  seventeenth Amendment Act. 1964 abridge the scope of Fundamental Rights and,  therefore, void under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution. 

 Parliament will have no power from the days of the decision to amend any of the  provisions of part Ill of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the Fundamental  Rights enshrined there in. 

The Constitutional validity of the 14th, 25th, and 29th Amendments was challenged in the  Fundamental Rights case. The Govt. of India claimed that it had the right as a matter of law to  change or destroy the entire fabric of the Constitution through the instrumentality of  parliament’s amending power. 

In Mnerva Milb ( 1980) the Supreme Court by A majority decision has trunk down Section 4  of the 42nd Amendment Act which gave preponderance to the Directive Principles over  Articles 24, 19 and 31 of part Ill ofthe Constitution, on the ground that part Ill and part IV ofthe  Constitution are equally important 

and absolute primacy of one over the other is not permissible as that would disturb the harmony  of the Constitution. The Supreme Court was convinced that anything that destroys the balance  between the two part will ipso facto destroy an essential element ofthe basic structure of our  Constitution. 

Judicial Review of Legislative Enactment and ordinances: 

One of the first major case A.K. Goplan v. Sue d Mahs. 1951 that came up before the Supreme  Court in which the preventive Intention Act, 1950 was challenged as invalid. The court by a  unanimous decision declared section 14 of the Act invalid and thus manifested its competence  to declare void any parliamentary enactment repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution. 

In Gampkan case, the Supreme Court held that the order of the state government fixing  proportionate scales, for different communities for admission to medical colleges was  unconstitutional. The presidential order de-recognizing privy purses was also challenged in the 

Supreme Coun which declared the order as unconstitutional and void. Between 1950-1980  parliament passed as many as 1977 Acts and out of them, the Supreme Court invalidate laws  passed on 22 occasions. 

Principles of Judicial Review: 

Justice in his book propounded a thesis that Judicial Review of legislation in India should rest  merely on Article 245 (1) and not on Article 13. According to him, Article 245 (1) interpreted  broadly would ensure the supremacy of the Constitution over all kinds oflaws. 

Thus, a law to be valid must conform with the Constitutional forms. The grave responsibility  ofdeciding upon the validity oflaws, is laid up on the judges ofthe Supreme Court. Ifa statue  isn’t within the scope of legislative authority or it offends some Constitutional restriction or  prohibition, that statue is unconstitutional and hence invalid. 

The Statue is not held unconstitutional by the court in a light vein. Both the ‘felt necessities  ofthe &ne’ and ‘Constitutional fundamentals’ are balanced by the court. Accordingly, the  Supreme Court has evolved certain canons, making and norms. H.M. Seervai has enumerated  following rules in this regard. 

 There is a presumption in favour of Constitutionality, and a law will not be declared  unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; and the on us to  prove that it is unconstitutional lies upon the person who challenges it. 

 Where the validity of a statue is questioned and there are two interpretations, one of  which would make the law vdid, and the other void, the former must be preferred and  the vü.ity ofthe law upheld. 

 The court will not decide Constitutional questions of a case are capable of being decided  on other grounds. 

 The court will not decide a larger Constitutional qyestion than is required by the case  before it. 

 The court will not hear an objection as to the Constitutionality of a law by a person  whose rights are not affected by it. 

 Ordinarily, courts should not pronounce on the validity of an Act or part of an Act, which  has not been brought into force, because till then the question of validity would be merely  academic. 

Indian judiciary has been able to overcome the restrictions that were put on it by the 42nd  amendment, with the help of the 43rd and 44th amendments. Now the redeeming quality of  Indian judiciary is that no future governments could did its wings or dilute its right of Judicial  Review. In fact, now the ‘Judicial Review’ is considered to be the basic feature of our  Constitution. 

Federal & Qaasi federal: 

India is not a true federation. It combines the features of a federal government and the features  of a unitary govemment which can also be called the non-federal features. Because of this,  India is regarded as a semifederal state. . The Supreme Court of India also describes it as “a  federal structure with a strong bias towards the Centre”.

The Centre exercises control over the States. The States have to respect the laws made by the  central govemment and cannot make any law on matters on which there is already a central  law. The centre can also give directions to the States which they must carry out. 

In a üue federation, the upper house ofthe legislature has equal representation from the  constituting units or the States. But in our Rajya Sabha, the States do not have equal  representation. The populous States have more representatives in the Rajya Sabha than the less  populous States. 

The upper house of the Indian Parliament, that is, the Rajya Sabha is not properly  representative of all the States of Indian union. In India, the existence ofa State or a federating  unit depends upon the authority of the Centre. The boundary of a State can be changed by  created out of the edsting States. 

In a true federal state, citizens are given dual citizenship. First, they are the citizens of their  respective provinces or States and then they are the citizens of the federation. In India however,  the citizens enjoy single citizenship, i.e., Indian citizenship or citizenship ofthe country as a  whole. 

CooperadveFedenlism: Although the Constitution of India has nowhere used the term ‘federal’,  it has provided for a structure of governance which is essentially federal in nature. First of all,  Constitution has provided separate governments at the Union and the States with separate  legislative, executive and judicial wings of governance. Secondly, Constitution has clearly  demarcated the jurisdictions, powers and ff.nctions ofthe Union and the State Governments.  Third, Constitution has spelt out in detail the legislative, administrative and financial relations  between the Union and the States. Within this basic framework of federalism, the Constitution  has given overriding powers to the Central govemment. States must exercise their executive  power in compliance with the laws made by the Central government and must not impede on  the executive power ofthe Union within the States. Govemors are appointed by the Central  government to oversee the States. The Centre can even take over the executive of the States  on the issues of national security or breakdown of Constitutional machinery of the State.  Considering the overriding powers given to the Central government, Indian federation has  often been described as ‘quasi-federation’, ‘semifederation’, ‘pragmatic federation’ or a  ‘federation with strong unitary features’. Indian federation should be seen in the context of its  democratic system of governance at the national, state and local levels and the pluralities of its  culture in terms of ethnic, linguistic, religious and other diversities which cut through the  States. India is the largest democratic country as also the largest federal and the largest pluralist  country ofthe world. While democracy provides freedom to everybody, federation ensures that  govemance is distributed spatially and a strong central govemment enables that the ‘unity  amidst diversity’ is maintained and the country mobilizes all its resources to maintain its  harmony and integrity and marches ahead to progress. A strong Centre in India is therefore  necessary for strong States and vice versa. This is the essence of cooperative federalism. So  long as the central and governments were ruled by the same political party, the cooperative  framework worked very well. Since the seventies when different political parties are in power  in the centre and the states and more recently when coalition governments of national and  regional parties are in power in the Centre, there are signs of stresses and tensions in  intergovemmental relations between the Centre and the States. Article 263 ofthe Constitution  has provided for the setting up of an Inter-State Council for investigation, discussion and  recommendation for better coordination of relation bem^reen the Centre and the States. The  Zonal Councils set up under the State Reorganization Act 1956 provide another institutional  mechanism for centre- state and inter-state cooperation to resolve the differences and  strengthen the framework of cooperation. The National Development Council and the National 

Integration Council are the two other important forums that provide opportunities for  discussion to resolve differences of opinion. Central councils have been set up by various  ministries to strengthen cooperation. Besides Chief Ministers, Finance and other Ministers  have their annual conferences in addition to the regular meetings and discussions ofthe offcials  ofthe Centre and the States to share mutual concerns on various issues. One of the challenges  of Indian federation would be how best these mechanisms of cooperative federalism can be  strengthened further to promote better coordination and cooperation between the Centre and  the States.Panchayat Raj System 73^rd and 74^th Constitutional Amendment Act: In 1992 was the  most significant year in the history of Panchayats in India as the 73rd amendment of the  Constitution (amendment ofArticle 243) was passed by the Indian Parliament that declared  Panchayats as institutions of self government. (The 74th amendment done at the same time  relate to urban local bodies). These amendments came into force from April 24 1993. The  major features of the 73rd amendment can be enumerated asunder: There should be three tiers  of Panchayats (District Panchayats, Block Panchayats i.e. intermediary Panchayats and Village  or Gram Panchayats) in states with over 25 lakh of population. States with less than this  population will have only two tiers omitting the intermediary tier. Panchayats declared as  institutions of self governments (signifying that the status of Panchayats is same in their  respective areas, as that ofthe Union Government at the national and State Governments at the  state level). States were mandated to devolve functions relating to 29 subjects (including  agriculture, land reforms, minor irrigation, fisheries, cottage and small scale industries, rural  communication, drinking water, poverty alleviation programmes etc.) to the Panchayats.  Panchayats were mandated to prepare plan(s) for economic development and social justice and  implement them. States were asked to constitute a State Finance Commission every five years  to determine the Panchayats’ share of state’s financial resources as a matter of entitlement (just  as the Central Finance Commission determines how resources ofthe Central government  should be shared between the union and state governments).Panchayat bodies must have  proportionate representation of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and women. Such  reservation should also apply in the cases of Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons of these  bodies.There shall be State Election Commission in each state which shall conduct elections  to the local bodies in every five years.The key mandatory provisions are:The establishment in  every state (except those with populations below 2 million) of rural local bodies (panchayats)  at the village, intermediate and district levels (Article 243B), Direct elections to all seats in the  panchayats at all levels (Article 243C)• 

Compulsory elections to panchayats every five years with the elections being held before the  end of the term ofthe incumbent panchayat in the event that a panchayat is dissolved  prematurely, elections must be held within six months, with the newly elected members  serving out the remainder of the five year term (Article 243E). 

Mandatory reservation of seats in all panchayats at all levels for Davits and Advises in  proportion to their share of the panchayat population (Article 243D)• 

Mandatory reservation ofone-third ofall seats in all panchayats at all levels for women, with  the reservation for women applying to the seats reserved for Davits and Advises as well  (Article 2431))’ Indirect elections to the position of panchayat chairperson at the intermediate  and district levels (Article 243C)• Mandatory reservation of the position of panchayat  chairperson at all levels for Davits and Advises in proportion to their share in the state  population (Article 243D)• 

Mandatory reservation of one-third of the positions ofpanchayat chairperson at all three levels  for women (Article 243D). 

In addition, the act mandates the Constitution of two state-level commissions: an independent  election commission to supervise and manage elections to local bodies, much as the Election 

Commission of India manages state assembly and parliamentary elections (Article 243K); and  a state finance commission, established every five years, to review the financial position  oflocal bodies and recommend the principles that should govem the a.llocationoffundsand  taxation authority to local bodies (Article 2431). The 74th Amendment act deals with urban  local bodies, a key article contained in that amendment applies to rural local bodies as well.The  article in question, Article 243ZD, mandates the Constitution of District Planning Committees  to consolidate the plans prepared by both rural and urban local bodies.ln order to facilitate a  well-planned husbanding of available resources, Panchayats and municipalities should be  informed as early as possible of what they might be expected to receive by way of tied and  untied funds under various budgeta.ryheadsforimplementingvarious schemes. This is an  essential pre-requisite for each tier of the Panchayati Raj system to prepare plans for its areas  of responsibility, as defined through Activity Mapping, and then for all these plans, along with  plans ofmunicipalities, to be “consolidated” by the District Planning Committees (DPC) as  mandated by Article 243 ZD ofthe Constitution. Itneeds to be underlined that the Constitution  does not provide for DPCs to prepare district plans on their own, but to “consolidate” local  area plans drawn up at lower tiers in both rural and urban areas of each district (A different  provision ofthe Constitution covers district planning for Metropolitan areas).